The debate about globalization as a world process, and its consequences, has been going on now in a variety of different fields of intellectual work for some time. What I am going to try and do here is to map some of the shifting configurations of this question, of the local and the global, particularly in relation to culture and in relation to cultural politics. I am going to try to discover what is emerging and how different subject positions are being transformed or produced in the course of the unfolding of the new dialectics of global culture. I will sketch in this aspect towards the end of this first talk and develop it in the second when I shall address the question of new and old identities. The question of ethnicity spans the two talks.

I am going to look at this from what might be thought of as a very privileged corner of the process, or rather, an unprivileged corner, a declining corner, that is, from the United Kingdom, and particularly, England. Certainly from the perspective of any historical account of English culture, globalization is far from a new process. Indeed, it is almost impossible to think about the formation of English society, or of the United Kingdom and all the things that give it a kind of privileged place in the historical narratives of the world, outside of the processes that we identify with globalization.

So when we are talking about globalization in the present context, we are talking about some of the new forms, some of the new rhythms, some of the new impetuses in the globalizing process. For the moment, I do not want to define it more closely than that but I do want to suggest that it is located within a much longer history; we suffer increasingly from a process of historical amnesia in which we think that just because we are thinking about an idea it has only just started.

As an entity and national culture, the United Kingdom rose with, and is declining with, one of the ears, or epochs, of globalization: that era when the formation of the world market was dominated by the economies and cultures of powerful nation-states. It is that relationship between the formation and transformation of the world market and its domination by the economies of powerful nation-states which constituted the era within which the formation of English culture took its existing shape. Imperialism was the system by which the world was engulfed in and by this framework, and also through the intensification of world rivalries between imperial formations. In this period, culturally, one sees the construction of a distinct cultural identity which I want to call the identity of Englishness. If you ask what the formative conditions are for a national culture like this to aspire to, and then acquire, a world historical identity, they would have a great deal to do with a nation's position as a leading commercial world power; it has to do with its position of leadership in a highly international and industrializing world economy, and with the fact that this society and its centers have long been placed at the center of a web of global commitments.

But it is not my purpose to sketch that out. What I am trying to ask something about is, what is the nature of cultural identity which belongs with that particular historical moment? And I have to say that, in fact, it was defined as a strongly centered, highly exclusive and exclusivist form of cultural identity. Exactly what the transformation to Englishness took place is quite a long story. But one can see a certain point at which the particular forms of English identity feel that they can command, within their own discourses, the discourses of almost everybody else; not quite everybody, but almost everyone else at a certain moment in history.

Certainly, the colonized Other was constituted within the regimes of representation of such a metropolitan center. They were placed in their otherness, in their marginality, by the nature of the "English eye," the all-encompassing "English eye." The "English eye" sees everything else but is not so good at recognizing that it is itself actually looking at something. It becomes coterminous with sight itself. It is, of
course, a structured representation nevertheless and it is a cultural representation which is always binary. That is to say, it is strongly centered; knowing where it is, what it is, it places everything else. And the thing which is wonderful about English identity is that it didn't only place the colonized Other, it placed everybody else.

To be English is to know yourself in relation to the French, and the hot-blood Mediterraneans, and the passionate, traumatized Russian soul. You go round the entire globe: when you know what everybody else is, then you are what they are not. Identity is always, in that sense, a structured representation which only achieves its positive through the narrow eye of the negative. It has to go through the eye of the needle of the other before it can construct itself. It produces a very Manichean set of opposites. When I speak about this way of being in the world, being English in the world, with a capital "E" as it were, it is grounded not only in a whole history, a whole set of histories, a whole set of economic relations, a whole set of cultural discourses, it is also profoundly grounded in certain forms of sexual identity. You cannot think of what the true-born Englishman is -- I mean, could you imagine advancing into the liberties of a true-born Englishwoman? It's unthinkable. It was not a phrase that was around. A free-born English person was clearly a free-born English man. And the fully buttoned-up, stiff upper lip, corseted notion of English masculinity is one of the ways in which this particular cultural identity was very firmly stitched into place. This kind of Englishness belongs to a certain historical moment in the unfolding of global processes. It is, in itself, a kind of ethnicity.

It has not been polite until the day before yesterday to call it this at all. One of the things which happens in England is the long discussion, which is just beginning, to try to convince the English that they are, after all, just another ethnic group. I mean a very interesting ethnic group, just hovering off the edge of Europe, with their own language, their own peculiar customs, their rituals, their myths. Like any other native peoples they have something which can be said in their favor, and of their long history. But ethnicity, in the sense that this is that which speaks itself as if it encompasses everything within its range is, after all, a very specific and peculiar form of ethnic identity. It is located in a place, in a specific history. It could not speak except out of a place, out of those histories. It is located in relation to a whole set of notions about territory, about where is home and where is overseas, what is close to us and what is far away. It is mapped out in all the terms in which we can understand what ethnicity is. It is, unfortunately, for a time, the ethnicity which places all the other ethnicities, but nevertheless, it is one in its own terms.

If you ask something about the nation for which this was the major representation and which could represent itself, culturally and ideologically, through the image of an English identity, or an English ethnicity, you will see, of course, what one always sees when one examines or opens up an ethnicity. It represents itself as perfectly natural: born an Englishman, always will be, condensed, homogenous, unitary. What is the point of an identity if it isn't one thing? That is why we keep hoping that identities will come our way because the rest of the world is so confusing: everything else is turning, but identities ought to be some stable points of reference which were like that in the past, are now and ever shall be, still points in a turning world.

But of course, Englishness never was and never possibly could be that. It was not that either in relation to those societies with which it was deeply connected, both as a commercial and global political power overseas. And one of the best-kept secrets of the world is that it was not that in relation to its own territory either. It was only by dint of excluding or absorbing all the differences that constituted Englishness, the multitude of different regions, peoples, classes, genders that composed the people gathered together in the Act of Union, that Englishness could stand for everybody in the British Isles. It was always negotiated against difference. It always had to absorb all the differences of class, of region, of gender, in order to present itself as a homogenous entity. And that is something which we are only now beginning to see the true nature of, when we are beginning to come to the end of it. Because with the processes of globalization, that form of relationship between a national cultural identity and a nation-state is now beginning, at any rate in Britain, to disappear. That notion of a national formation, of a national economy, which could be represented through a national cultural identity, is under considerable pressure. I ought to try and identify very briefly what it is that is happening which makes that an untenable configuration to keep in place for very much longer.
First of all, in the British case, it results from a long process of economic decline. From being the leading economic power in the world, at the pinnacle of commercial and industrial development, the first industrializing nation, Britain then became simply one amongst other, better, stronger, competing, new industrializing nations. It is certainly no longer at the forefront, or at the cutting edge, of industrial and economic development.

The trend towards the greater internationalization of the economy, rooted in the multinational firm, built on the foundations of Fordist models of mass production, and mass consumption long outran some of the most important leading instances of this which one can find in the British economy. From the position of being in the forefront, Britain has increasingly fallen behind as the new regimes of accumulation, production, and consumption have created new leading nations in the global economy.

More recently, the capitalist crisis of the seventies has accelerated the opening up of new global markets, both commodity markets and financial markets, to which Britain has been required to harness itself if it were not to be left behind in the race. With the horrendous noise of deindustrialization, Britain is, under Thatcherism, trying to ground itself somewhere close to the leading edge of the new technologies which have linked production and markets in a new surge of international global capital. The deregulation of the City is simply one sign of the movement of the British economy and the British culture to enter the new epoch of financial capital. And new multinational production, the new international division of labor, not only links backward sections of the third world to so-called advanced sections of the first world in a form of multinational production, but increasingly tries to reconstitute the backward sectors within its own society: those forms of contracting out, of franchising, which are beginning to create small dependent local economies which are linked into multi-national production. All of these have broken up in the economic, political and social terrain on which those earlier notions of Englishness prospered.

Those are things which one knows about. Those are the constituent elements of the process which is called globalization. I want to add some other things to them because I think we tend to think about globalization in too unitary a way. And you will see why I am going to insist on that point in a moment.

Something else which has been breaking up that older, unitary formation is certainly the enormous, continuing migrations of labor in the post-war period. There is a tremendous paradox here which I cannot help relishing myself; that in the very moment when finally Britain convinced itself it had to decolonize, it had to get rid of them, we all came back home. As they hauled down the flag, we got on the banana boat and sailed right into London. That is a terrible paradox because they had ruled the world for three hundred years and, at least, when they had made up their minds to climb out of that hole, at least the others ought to have stayed out there in the rim, behaved themselves, gone somewhere else, or found some other client state. No, they had always said that this was really home, the streets were paved with gold and, bloody hell, we just came to check out whether that was so or not. And I am the product of that. I came right in. Someone said, "Why don't you live in Milton Keynes, where you work?" You have to live in London. If you come from the sticks, the colonial sticks, where you really want to live is right on Eros Statue in Piccadilly Circus. You don't want to go and live in someone else's metropolitan sticks. You want to go right to the center of the hub of the world. You might as well. You have been hearing about that ever since you were one month old. When I first got to England in 1951, I looked out and there were Wordsworth's daffodils. Of course, what else would you expect to find? That's what I knew about. That is what trees and flowers meant. I didn't know the names of the flowers I'd just left behind in Jamaica. One has also to remember that Englishness has not only been decentered by the great dispersal of capital to Washington, Wall Street and Tokyo, but also by this enormous influx which is part of the cultural consequences of the labor migrations, the migrations of peoples, which go on at an accelerated pace in the modern world.

Another aspect of globalization comes from a quite different direction, from increasing international interdependence. This can be looked at in two quite different ways.
First, there is the growth of monetary and regional arrangements which link Britain into NATO, the Common Market and similar organizations. There is a growth of these regional, supranational organizations and connections which simply make it impossible, if it ever was, to try to conceive of what is going on in English society as if it only had an internal dynamic. And this is a very profound shift, a shift in the conceptions of sovereignty, and of the nation-state. It is a shift in the conception of what the English government can do, what is in its control, transformations which it could bring about by its own efforts. These things increasingly are seen to be interdependent with the economies, cultures and polities of other societies.

Last but not least is the enormous impact of global ecological interdependence. When the ill winds of Chernobyl came our way, they did not pause at the frontier, produce their passports and say, "Can I rain on your territory now?" They just flowed on in and rained on Wales and on places which never knew where Chernobyl was. Recently, we have been enjoying some of the pleasures and anticipating some of the disasters of global warming. The sources and consequences are miles away. We could only begin to do something about it on the basis of some form of ecological consciousness which has to have, as its subject, something that is larger than the freeborn Englishman. The freeborn Englishman cannot do anything about the destruction of the rain forest in Brazil. And he hardly knows how to spell ozone.

So, something is escaping here from this older unit which was the lynchpin of globalization of an earlier phase; it is beginning to be eroded. We will come to look back at this era in terms of the importance of the erosion of the nation-state and the national identities which are associated with it.

The erosion of the nation-state, national economies and national cultural identities is a very complex and dangerous moment. Entities of power are dangerous when they are ascending and when they are declining and it is a moot point whether they are more dangerous in the second or in the first moment. The first moment, they gobble up everybody and in the second moment they take everybody down with them. So when I say the decline or erosion of the nation-state, do not for a moment imagine that the nation-state is bowing off the stage of history. "I'm sorry, I was here for so long. I apologize for all the things that I did to you -- nationalism, jingoism, ferocious warfare, racism. I apologize for all that. Can I go now?" It is not backing off like that. It goes into an even deeper trough of defensive exclusivism.

Consequently, at the very moment when the so-called material basis of the old English identity is disappearing over the horizon of the West and the East, Thatcherism brings Englishness into a more firm definition, a narrower but firmer definition than it ever had before. Now we are prepared to go to anywhere to defend it: to the South Seas, to the South Atlantic. If we cannot defend it in reality, we will defend it in mime. What else can you call the Falklands episode? Living the past entirely through myth. Reliving the age of the dictators, not just as farce but as myth, a very defensive organization. We have never been so close to an embattled defensiveness of a narrow, national definition of Englishness, of cultural identity. And Thatcherism is grounded in that. When Thatcherism speaks, frequently asking the question, "Are you one of us?" Who is one of us? Well, the numbers of people who are not one of us would fill a book. Hardly anybody is one of us any longer. Northern Ireland is not one of us because they are bogged down in sectarian warfare. The Scots are not one of us because they did not vote for us. The Northeast and the Northwest are not one of us because they are manufacturing and declining and they have not jumped on to the enterprise culture; they are not on the bandwagon to the South in their heads. No Blacks are, of course, not quite. There may be one or two who are "honorary" but you cannot really be one of us. Women can only be in their traditional roles because if they get outside their traditional roles they are clearly beginning to edge to the margins.

The question is still asked in the expectation that it might have been answered with the same large confidence with which the English have always occupied their own identities. But it cannot be occupied in that way any longer. It is produced with enormous effort. Huge ideological work has to go on every day to produce this mouse which people can recognize as the English. You have to look at everything in order to produce it. You have to look at the curriculum, at the Englishness of English art, at what is truly English poetry, and you
have to rescue that from all the other things that are not. Everywhere, the question of Englishness is in contention.

All I want to say about that is, that when the era of nation-states in globalization begins to decline, one can see a regression to a very defensive and highly dangerous form of national identity which is driven by a very aggressive form of racism.

That is something of the story of questions of ethnicity and identity in an older form of globalization. What Thatcherism and other European societies are trying to come to terms with is how to enter new forms of globalization.

The new forms of globalization are rather different from the ones I have just described. One of the things which happens when the nation-state begins to weaken, becoming less convincing and less powerful, is that the response seems to go in two ways simultaneously. It goes above the nation-state and it goes below it. It goes global and local in the same moment. Global and local are the two faces of the same movement from one epoch of globalization, the one which has been dominated by the nation-state, the national economies, the national cultural identities, to something new.

What is this new kind of globalization? The new kind of globalization is not English, it is American. In cultural terms, the new kind of globalization has to do with a new form of global mass culture, very different from that associated with English identity, and the cultural identities associated with the nation-state in an earlier phase. Global mass culture is dominated by the modern means of cultural production, dominated by the image which crosses and re-crosses linguistic frontiers much more rapidly and more easily, and which speaks across languages in a much more immediate way. It is dominated by all the ways in which the visual and graphic arts have entered directly into the reconstitution of popular life, of entertainment and of leisure. It is dominated by television and by film, and by the image, imagery, and styles of mass advertising. Its epitomy is in all those forms of mass communication of which one might think of satellite television as the prime example. Not because it is the only example but because you could not understand satellite television without understanding its grounding in a particular advanced national economy and culture and yet its whole purpose is precisely that it cannot be limited any longer by national boundaries.

We have just, in Britain, opened up the new satellite TV called "Sky Channel," owned by Rupert Murdoch. It sits just above the Channel. It speaks across to all the European societies at once and as it went up all the older models of communication in our society were being dismantled. The notion of the British Broadcasting Corporation, of a public service interest, is rendered anachronistic in a moment.

It is a very contradictory space because, at the same time as sending the satellite aloft, Thatcherism sends someone to watch the satellite. So Mrs. Thatcher has put into orbit Rupert Murdoch and the "Sky Channel" but also, a new Broadcasting Standards Committee to make sure that the satellite does not immediately communicate soft pornography to all of us after 11 o'clock when the children are in bed.

So this is not an uncontradictory phenomenon. One side of Thatcherism, the respectable, traditional side, is watching the free market side. This is the bifurcated world that we live in but nevertheless, in terms of what is likely to carry the new international global mass culture back into the old nation-states, the national cultures of European societies, it is very much at the leading edge of the transmitters of the image. And as a consequence of the explosion of those new forms of cultural communication and cultural representation there has opened up a new field of visual representation itself.

It is this field which I am calling global mass culture. Global mass culture has a variety of different characteristics but I would identify two. One is that it remains centered in the West. That is to say, Western technology, the concentration of capital, the concentration of techniques, the concentration of advanced labor in
the Western societies, and the stories and the imagery of Western societies: these remain the driving powerhouse of this global mass culture. In that sense, it is centered in the West and it always speaks English.

On the other hand, this particular form does not speak the Queen's English any longer. It speaks English as an international language which is quite a different thing. It speaks a variety of broken forms of English: English as it has been invaded, and as it has hegemonized a variety of other languages without being able to exclude them from it. It speaks Anglo-Japanese, Anglo-French, Anglo-German or Anglo-English indeed. It is a new form of international language, not quite the same old class-stratified, class-dominated, canonically-secured form of standard or traditional highbrow English. That is what I mean by "centered in the West." It is centered in the languages of the West but it is not centered in the same way.

The second most important characteristic of this form of global mass culture is its peculiar form of homogenization. It is a homogenizing form of cultural representation, enormously absorptive of things, as it were, but the homogenization is never absolutely complete, and it does not work for completeness. It is not attempting to produce little mini-versions of Englishness everywhere, or little versions of Americanness. It is wanting to recognize and absorb those differences within the larger, overarching framework of what is essentially an American conception of the world. That is to say, it is very powerfully located in the increasing and ongoing concentration of culture and other forms of capital. But it is now a form of capital which recognizes that it can only, to use a metaphor, rule through the local capitals, rule alongside and in partnership with other economic and political elites. It does not attempt to obliterate them; it operates through them. It has to hold the whole framework of globalization in place and simultaneously police that system: it stage-manages independence within it, so to speak. You have to think about the relationship between the United States and Latin America to discover what I am talking about, how those forms which are different, which have their own specificity, can nevertheless be repenetrated, absorbed, reshaped, negotiated, without absolutely destroying what is specific and particular to them.

We used to think at an earlier stage, that if one could simply identify the logic of capital, that it would gradually engross everything in the world. It would translate everything in the world into a kind of replica of itself, everywhere; that all particularity would disappear; that capital in its onward, rationalizing march would not in the end care whether you were black, green or blue so long as you could sell your labor as a commodity. It would not care whether you were male or female, or a bit of both, provided it could deal with you in terms of the commodification of labor.

But the more we understand about the development of capital itself, the more we understand that that is only part of the story. That alongside that drive to commodify everything, which is certainly one part of its logic, is another critical part of its logic which works in and through specificity. Capital has always been quite concerned with the question of the gendered nature of labor power. It has never been able to obliterate the importance to itself of the gendered nature of labor power. It has always been able to work in and through the sexual division of labor in order to accomplish the commodification of labor. It has always been able to work between the different ethnically- and racially-inflected labor forces. So that notion of the overarching, ongoing, totally rationalizing, has been a very deceptive way of persuading ourselves of the totally integrative and all-absorbent capacities of a capital itself.

As a consequence, we have lost sight of one of the most profound insights in Marx's *Capital* which is that capitalism only advances, as it were, on contradictory terrain. It is the contradictions which it has to overcome that produce its own forms of expansion. And that until one can see the nature of that contradictory terrain and precisely how particularity is engaged and how it is woven in, and how it presents its resistances, and how it is partly overcome, and how those overcomings then appear again, we will not understand it. That is much closer to how we ought to think about the so-called "logic of capital" in the advance of globalization itself.
Until we move away from the notion of this singular, unitary logic of capital which does not mind where it operates, we will not fully understand it. Can I refer to a number of things we have not been able to understand as a consequence of reading Capital that way? We have not been able to understand why anybody is still religious at the end of the twentieth century. It ought to have gone; that is one of the forms of particularity. We have not been able to understand why nationalism, an old form of particularism, is still around. All those particularisms ought by now to have been modernized out of existence. And yet what we find is that the most advanced forms of modern capital on a global scale are constantly splitting old societies into their advanced and their not so advanced sectors. Capital is constantly exploiting different forms of labor force, constantly moving between the sexual division of labor in order to accomplish its commodification of social life.

I think it is extremely important to see this more contradictory notion, this whole line of development which is leading to different phases of global expansion, because otherwise we do not understand the cultural terrain that is in front of us.

I have tried then to describe the new forms of global economic and cultural power which are apparently paradoxical: multi-national but de-centered. It is hard to understand but I think that is what we are moving into: not the unity of the singular corporate enterprise which tries to encapsulate the entire world within its confines, but much more decentralized and decentered forms of social and economic organization.

Not everywhere, by any means, but in some of the most advanced parts of the globalization process what one finds are new regimes of accumulation, much more flexible regimes founded not simply on the logics of mass production and of mass consumption but on new flexible accumulation strategies, on segmented markets, on post-Fordist styles of organization, on lifestyle and identify-specific forms of marketing, driven by the market, driven by just-in-time production, driven by the ability to address not the mass audience, or the mass consumer, but penetrating to the very specific smaller groups, to individuals, in its appeal.

From one point of view, you might say that this is just the old enemy in a new disguise and that actually is the question I am going to pose. Is this just the old enemy in a new disguise? Is this the ever-rolling march of the old form of commodification, the old form of globalization, fully in the keeping of capital, fully in the keeping of the West, which is simply able to absorb everybody else within its drive? Or is there something important about the fact that, at a certain point, globalization cannot proceed without learning to live with and working through difference?

If you look at one of the places to see this speaking itself, or beginning to represent itself, it is in the forms of modern advertising. If you look at these what you will see is that certain forms of modern advertising are still grounded on the exclusive, powerful, dominant, highly masculinist, old Fordist imagery, of a very exclusive set of identities. But side by side with them are the new exotics, and the most sophisticated thing is to be in the new exotica. To be at the leading edge of modern capitalism is to eat fifteen different cuisines in any one week, not to eat one. It is no longer important to have boiled beef and carrots and Yorkshire pudding every Sunday. Who needs that? Because if you are just jetting in from Tokyo, via Harare, you come in loaded, not with "how everything is the same" but how wonderful it is, that everything is different. In one trip around the world, in one weekend, you can see every wonder of the ancient world. You take it in as you go by, all in one, living with difference, wondering at pluralism, this concentrated, corporate, over-corporate, over-integrated, over-concentrated, and condensed form of economic power which lives culturally through difference and which is constantly teasing itself with the pleasures of transgressive Other.

You see the difference from the earlier form of identity that I was describing: embattled Britain, in its corsetted form, rigidly tied to the Protestant Ethic. In England, for a very long time, certainly under Thatcherism, even now, you can only harness people to your project if you promise them a bad time. You can't promise them a good time. You promise them a good time later on. Good times will come. But you first of all have to go through a thousand hard winters for six months of pleasure. Indeed, the whole rhetoric of
Thatcherism has been one which has constructed the past in exactly that way. That is what was wrong about the sixties and seventies. All that swinging, all that consumption, all that pleasurable stuff. You know, it always ends in a bad way. You always have to pay for it in the end.

Now, the regime I am talking about does not have this pleasure/pain economy built into it. It is pleasure endlessly. Pleasure to begin with, pleasure in the middle, pleasure at the end, nothing but pleasure: the proliferation of difference, questions of gender and sexuality. It lives with the new man. It produced the new man before anyone was ever convinced he even existed. Advertising produced the image of the post-feminist man. Some of us cannot find him, but he is certainly there in the advertising. I do not know whether anybody is living with him currently but he's there, out there in the advertising.

In England it is these new forms of globalized power that are most sensitive to questions of feminism. It says, "Of course, there'll be women working with us. We must think about the question of creches. We must think about equal opportunities for Black people. Of course, everybody knows somebody of different skin. How boring it would be just to know people like us. We don't know people like us. We can go anywhere in the world and have friends who are Japanese, you know. We were in East Africa last week and then we were on safari and we always go to the Caribbean, etc."

This is what I call the world of the global post-modern. Some parts of the modern globalization process are producing the global post-modern. The global post-modern is not a unitary regime because it is still in tension within itself with an older, embattled, more corporate, more unitary, more homogenous conception of its own identity. That struggle is being fought out within itself and you may not see it actually. If you don't see it, you ought to. Because you ought to be able to hear the way in which, in American society, in American culture, those two voices speak at one and the same time. The voice of infinite pleasurable consumption and what I call "the exotic cuisine" and, on the other hand, the voice of the moral majority, the more fundamental and traditional conservative ideas. They are not coming out of different places, they are coming out of the same place. It is the same balancing act which Thatcherism is trying to conduct by releasing Rupert Murdoch and Sir William Rees Mogg at one and the same time, in the hope that they will kind of hold on to one another. An old petite bourgeois morality will constrain the already deregulated Rupert Murdoch. Somehow, these two people are going to live in the same universe -- together.

So, the notion of globalization as a non-contradictory, uncontested space in which everything is fully within the keeping of the institutions, so that they perfectly know where it is going, I simply do not believe. I think the story points to something else: that in order to maintain its global position, capital has had to negotiate and by negotiate I mean it had to incorporate and partly reflect the differences it was trying to overcome. It had to try to get hold of, and neutralize, to some degree, the differences. It is trying to constitute a world in which things are different. And that is the pleasure of it but the differences do not matter.

Now the question is: is this simply the final triumph, the closure of history by the West? Is globalization nothing but the triumph and closure of history by the West? Is this the final moment of a global post-modern where it now gets hold of everybody, of everything, where there is no difference which it cannot contain, no otherness it cannot speak, no marginality which it cannot take pleasure out of?

It's clear, of course, that when I speak about the exotic cuisine, they are not eating the exotic cuisine in Calcutta. They're eating it in Manhattan. So do not imagine this is evenly and equally spread throughout the world. I am talking about a process of profound unevenness. But I am nevertheless saying that we shouldn't resolve that question too quickly. It is just another face of the final triumph of the West. I know that position. I know it is very tempting. It is what I call ideological post-modernism: I can't see round the edge of it and so history must have just ended. That form of post-modernism I don't buy. It is what happens to ex-Marxist French intellectuals when they head for the desert.
But there is another reason why one should not see this form of globalization as simply unproblematic and uncontradictory, because I have been talking about what is happening within its own regimes, within its own discourses. I have not yet talked about what is happening outside it, what is happening at the margins. So, in the conclusion of this talk, I want to look at the process from the point of view, not of globalization, but of the local. I want to talk about two forms of globalization, still struggling with one another: an older, corporate, enclosed, increasingly defensive one which has to go back to nationalism and national cultural identity in a highly defensive way, and to try to build barriers around it before it is eroded. And then this other form of the global post-modern which is trying to live with, and at the same moment, overcome, sublate, get hold of, and incorporate difference.

What has been happening out there in the local? What about the people who did not go above the globalization but went underneath, to the local?

The return to the local is often a response to globalization. It is what people do when, in the face of a particular form of modernity which confronts them in the form of the globalization I have described, they opt out of that and say "I don't know anything about that any more. I can't control it. I know no politics which can get hold of it. It's too big. It's too inclusive. Everything is on its side. There are some terrains in between, little interstices, the smaller spaces within which I have to work." Though, of course, one has to see this always in terms of the relationship between unevenly-balanced discourses and regimes. But that is not all that we have to say about the local.

For it would be an extremely odd and peculiar history of this part of the twentieth century if we were not to say that the most profound cultural revolution has come about as a consequence of the margins coming into representation -- in art, in painting, in film, in music, in literature, in the modern arts everywhere, in politics, and in social life generally. Our lives have been transformed by the struggle of the margins to come into representation. Not just to be placed by the regime of some other, or imperializing eye but to reclaim some form of representation for themselves.

Paradoxically in our world, marginally has become a powerful space. It is a space of weak power but it is a space of power, nonetheless. In the contemporary arts, I would go so far as to say that, increasingly anybody who cares for what is creatively emergent in the modern arts will find that it has something to do with the languages of the margin.

The emergence of new subjects, new genders, new ethnicities, new regions, new communities, hitherto excluded from the major forms of cultural representation, unable to locate themselves except as a decentered or subaltern, have acquired through struggle, sometimes in very marginalized ways, the means to speak for themselves for the first time. And the discourses of power in our society, the discourses of the dominant regimes, have been certainly threatened by this de-centered cultural empowerment of the marginal and the local.

Just as I tried to talk about homogenization and absorption, and then plurality and diversity as characteristic of the new forms of the dominant cultural post-modern, so in the same way one can see forms of local opposition and resistance going through exactly the same moment.

Face to face with a culture, an economy and a set of histories which seem to be written or inscribed elsewhere, and which are so immense, transmitted from one continent to another with such extraordinary speed, the subjects of the local, of the margin, can only come into representation by, as it were, recovering their own hidden histories. They have to try to retell the story from the bottom up, instead of from the top down. And this moment has been of such profound significance in the post-war world that you could not describe the post-war world without it. You could not describe the movements of colonial nationalism without that moment when the unspoken discovered that they had a history which they could speak; they had languages other than the languages of the master, of the tribe. It is an enormous moment. The world begins to be decolonized at that
moment. You could not understand the movements of modern feminism precisely without the recovery of the hidden histories.

These are the hidden histories of the majority that never got told. History without the majority inside it, history as a minority event. You could not discover, or try to discuss, the Black movements, civil rights movements, the movements of Black cultural politics in the modern world, without that notion of the rediscovery of where people came from, the return to some kind of roots, the speaking of a past which previously had no language. The attempt to snatch from the hidden histories another place to stand in, another place to speak from, and that moment is an extremely important moment. It is a moment which always tends to be overrun and to be martinalized by the dominant forces of globalization.

But do not misunderstand me. I am not taking about some ideal free space in which everybody says, "Come on in. Tell us what you think. I'm glad to hear from you." They did not say that. But those languages, those discourses, it has not been possible to silence in the last twenty years.

Those movements also have an extraordinarily complex history. Because at some time, in the histories of many of them over the last twenty years, they have become locked into counter-identities of their own. It is a respect for local roots which is brought to bear against the anonymous, impersonal world of the globalized forced which we do not understand. "I can't speak of the world but I can speak of my village. I can speak of my neighborhood, I can speak of my community." The face-to-face communities that are knowable, that are locatable, one can give them a place. One knows what the voices are. One knows what the faces are. The recreation, the reconstruction of imaginary, knowable places in the face of the global post-modern which has, as it were, destroyed the identities of specific places, absorbed them into this post-modern flux of diversity. So one understands the moment when people reach for those groundings, as it were, and the reach for those groundings is what I call ethnicity.

Ethnicity is the necessary place or space from which people speak. It is a very important moment in the birth and development of all the local and marginal movements which have transformed the last twenty years, that moment of the rediscovery of their own ethnicities.

But just as, when one looks at the global post-modern, one sees that it can go in both an expansive and a defensive way, in the same sense one sees that the local, the marginal, can also go in two different ways. When the movements of the margins are so profoundly threatened by the global forces of postmodernity, they can themselves retreat into their own exclusivist and defensive enclaves. And at that point, local ethnicities become as dangerous as national ones. We have seen that happen: the refusal of modernity which takes the form of a return, a rediscovery of identity which constitutes a form of fundamentalism.

But that is not the only way in which the rediscovery of ethnicity has to go. Modern theories of enunciation always oblige us to recognize that enunciation comes from somewhere. It cannot be unplaced, it cannot be unpositioned, it is always positioned in a discourse. It is when a discourse forgets that it is placed that it tries to speak everybody else. It is exactly when Englishness is the world identity, to which everything else is only a small ethnicity. That is the moment when it mistakes itself as a universal language. But in fact, it comes from a place, out of a specific history, out of a specific set of power relationships. It speaks within a tradition. Discourse, in that sense, is always placed. So the moment of the rediscovery of a place, a past, of one's roots, of one's context, seems to me a necessary moment of enunciation. I do not think the margins could speak up without first grounding themselves somewhere.

But the problem is, do they have to be trapped in the place from which they begin to speak? Is it going to become another exclusive set of local identities? My answer to that is, probably, but not necessarily so. And in closing, I will tell you one little local example why I give that answer.
I was involved in a photographic exhibition which was organized in London by the Commonwealth Institute. The Commonwealth Institute had this idea; it got money from one of the very large, ex-colonial banks who were anxious to pay a little guilt money back to the societies which they had exploited for so long, and they said: "We'll give a series of regional prizes in which we'll use photography; we know that everybody in these societies doesn't have access to photography but photography is a widespread medium. Lots of people have cameras; it reaches a much wider audience. And we'll ask the different societies that used to be linked together under the hegemonic definition of the Commonwealth to begin to represent their own lives, to begin to speak about their own communities, to tell us about the differences, the diversities of life in these different societies that used to be all threaded together by the domination of the English imperialism. That's what the Commonwealth was, the harnessing of a hundred different histories within one singular history. The history of the Commonwealth." This was a notion of using the cultural medium of photography to explode that old unity and proliferate, to diversity, to see the images of life as people in the margins represented themselves photographically. The exhibition was judged in the far regions of the world where there are Commonwealth countries, and then was judged centrally. What was that exhibition like?

We found precisely what enormous access can be given to such peoples when the margins are empowered, in however small a way. Extraordinary stories, pictures, images of people looking at their own societies with the means of modern representation for the first time. Suddenly, the myth of unity, the unified identity of the Commonwealth, was simply exploded. Forty different peoples, with forty different histories, all located in a different way in relation to the uneven march of capital across the globe, harnessed at a certain point with the birth of the modern British Empire -- all these things had been brought into one place and stamped with an overall identity. You will all be in one, contribute to one overall system. That is what the system was, the harnessing of these differences. And now, as that center begins to weaken, so the differences begin to pull away. That was an enormous moment of the empowering of difference and diversity. It is the moment of what I call the rediscovery of ethnicity, of people photographing their own homes, for their own families, their own pieces of work.

We also discovered two other things. In our naivety, we thought that the moment of the rediscovery of ethnicity, in this sense, would be a rediscovery of what we called "the past," of people's roots. But the funny thing is that the past has not been sitting down there waiting to be discovered. The people from the Caribbean who went home [where is that, you know?] to photograph the past [where is that, you know?]: what explodes through the camera is twentieth-century Africa not seventeenth century Africa. The homeland is not waiting back there for the new ethnics to rediscover it. There is a past to be learned about, but the past is now seen, and has to be grasped as a history, as something that has to be told. It is narrated. It is grasped through memory. It is grasped through desire. It is grasped through reconstruction. It is not just a fact that has been waiting to ground our identities. What emerges from this is nothing like an uncomplicated, dehistoricised, undynamic, uncontradictory past. Nothing like that is the image which is caught in that moment of return.

But then the second, more extraordinary thing is that people want to speak right out of that most local moment -- what do they want to talk about? Everywhere. They want to tell you about how they came from the smallest village in the deepest recesses of wherever and went straight by New York to London. They want to talk bout what the metropolis, what the cosmopolitan world looks like to an ethnic. They were not prepared to come on as "ethnic artists." "I will show you my crafts, my skills; I will dress up, metaphorically in my traditions, I will speak my language for your edification." They had to locate themselves somewhere but they wanted to address problems which could no longer be contained within a narrow version of ethnicity. They did not want to go back and defend something which was ancient, which had stood still, which had refused the opening to new things. They wanted to speak right across those boundaries, and across those frontiers.

When I stopped talking about the global, I asked, is this the cleverest story the West has ever told or is this a more contradictory phenomenon? Now I ask exactly the opposite. Is the local just the little local exception, just what used to be called a blip in history? It will not register anywhere, it doesn't do anything, it is not very profound. It is just waiting to be incorporated, eaten up by the all-seeing eye of global capital as it
advances across the terrain. Or is it also, itself, in an extremely contradictory state? It is also moving, historically being transformed, speaking across older and new languages. Think about the languages of modern contemporary music and try to ask, where are the traditional musics left that have never heard a modern musical transcription? Are there any musics left that have not heard some other music? All the most explosive modern musics are crossovers. The aesthetics of modern popular music is the aesthetics of the hybrid, the aesthetics of the crossover, the aesthetics of the diaspora, the aesthetics of creolization. It is the mix of musics which is exciting to a young person who comes right out of what Europe is pleased to think of as some ancient civilization, and which Europe can control. The West can control it if only they will stay there, if only they will remain simple tribal folks. The moment they want to get hold of, not the nineteenth-century technology to make all the mistakes the West did for another hundred years, but to leap over that and get hold of some of the modern technologies to speak their own tongue, to speak of their own condition, then they are out of place, then the Other is not where it is. The primitive has somehow escaped from control.

Well, I am not trying to help you to sleep better at night, to say it's really all right, the revolution throbs down there, it's living, it's all ok. You just have to wait for the local to erupt and disrupt the global. I am not telling any kind of story like that. I am asking that we simply do not think of globalization as a pacific and pacified process. It's not a process at the end of history. It is working on the terrain of post-modern culture as a global formation, which is an extremely contradictory space. Within that, we have, in entirely new forms which we are only just beginning to understand, the same old contradictions, the same old struggle. Not the same old contradictions but continuing contradictions of things which are trying to get hold of other things, and things which are trying to escape from their grasp. That old dialectic is not at an end. Globalization does not finish it off.

With the story about the Commonwealth Institute Photography Exhibition I tried to speak about questions of new forms of identity. But I have just barely signalled that. How can we think the notion of what these new identities might be? What would be an identity that is constructed through things which are different rather than things which are the same? This I shall address in my second talk.