ROBERT W. LURZ

(with William and James)


EDUCATION:

Ph. D., Philosophy, Temple University, 1998
B. A., Philosophy, University of Buffalo, 1991

AREA OF SPECIALIZATION:

Philosophy of Mind

Cognitive Science

PUBLICATIONS:

Edited Books:

Philosophy of Animal Minds: New Essays on Animal Thought and Consciousness, Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Articles:

If Chimpanzees are mindreaders could behavioral science tell? Toward a solution of the logical problem, Philosophical Psychology, 2009.

Feigning introspective blindness (Commentary on Peter Carruthers' "How we know our own minds"), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2009.

In Defense of Wordless Thoughts About Thoughts, Mind and Language, 22, 2007.

Conscious Beliefs and Desires: A Same-Order Approach, in U. Kriegel and K. Williford (Eds.) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, MIT Press, 2006.

Either FOR or HOR: A False Dichotomy, in Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness (Ed. R. Gennaro), John Benjamins Publishing, Netherlands.

Neither HOT nor COLD: An Alternative Account of Consciousness, Psyche 8, 2003.

Advancing the Debate Between HOT and FO Theories of Consciousness, Journal of Philosophical Research 28, 2003.

Begging the Question: A Reply to Lycan, Analysis 61, 2001.

How to Solve the Distinguishability Problem, Brain and Behavioral Sciences 24:6, 2001.

Taking the First-Person Approach, Psyche 7, 2001.

A Defense of First-Order Representational Theories of Mental-State Consciousness, Psyche 5, 2000.

Animal Consciousness, Journal of Philosophical Research 24, 1999.

 

Encyclopedia Entry

Animal Minds, in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

 

Reviews & Review Essays:

Review of José Luis Bermúdez’s Thinking Without Words, Philosophical Inquiry 27, 2006

Reducing Consciousness by Making it HOT: A Review of Carruthers’ Phenomenal Consciousness, Psyche 8, 2002

In Search of The Metaphor of the Mind: A Critical Review of Baars' In the Theater of Consciousness, Philosophical Psychology, forthcoming.

A review of Species of Mind, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6, 1998.

 

Nonverbal false-belief test

 

 

Department of Philosophy

Brooklyn College, City University of New York