ROBERT W. LURZ

(with William and James)

EDUCATION:

Ph. D., Philosophy, Temple University, 1998
B. A., Philosophy, University of Buffalo, 1991

AREA OF SPECIALIZATION:

Philosophy of Mind

Cognitive Science

PUBLICATIONS:

Edited Books:

Philosophy of Animal Minds: New Essays on Animal Thought and Consciousness, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

Articles:

In Defense of Wordless Thoughts About Thoughts, Mind and Language, 22, 2007

Conscious Beliefs and Desires: A Same-Order Approach, in U. Kriegel and K. Williford (Eds.) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, MIT Press, 2006.

Either FOR or HOR: A False Dichotomy, in Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness (Ed. R. Gennaro), John Benjamins Publishing, Netherlands.

Neither HOT nor COLD: An Alternative Account of Consciousness, Psyche 8, 2003.

Advancing the Debate Between HOT and FO Theories of Consciousness, Journal of Philosophical Research 28, 2003.

Begging the Question: A Reply to Lycan, Analysis 61, 2001.

How to Solve the Distinguishability Problem, Brain and Behavioral Sciences 24:6, 2001.

Taking the First-Person Approach, Psyche 7, 2001.

A Defense of First-Order Representational Theories of Mental-State Consciousness, Psyche 5, 2000.

Animal Consciousness, Journal of Philosophical Research 24, 1999.

Reviews & Review Essays:

Review of José Luis Bermúdez’s Thinking Without Words, Philosophical Inquiry 27, 2006

Reducing Consciousness by Making it HOT: A Review of Carruthers’ Phenomenal Consciousness, Psyche 8, 2002

In Search of The Metaphor of the Mind: A Critical Review of Baars' In the Theater of Consciousness, Philosophical Psychology, forthcoming.

A review of Species of Mind, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6, 1998.

Conference Papers:

Wordless Thoughts and Their Supposed Limits, colloquium paper at APA Pacific Division, March 2006

Consciousness and the Representational Theory of Mind: An Overview of the Philosophical Debate, invited talk at the Asian American / Asian Research Institute, September 2005.

Commentator on Joseph Levine’s talk at the Self-Representational Theories of Consciousness Conference at the Center for Consciousness Studies, University of Arizona, March 2005.

Philosophy of Mind and AI: Why Being a Computer Isn’t Sufficient for Having Conscious Thought, presented at the symposium, Models of Mind, at Brooklyn College’s Faculty Day, 2004.

Either FOR or HOR: A False Dichotomy, presented at the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness at Memphis University, 2003.

Neither HOT nor COLD: A just SO Theory of Consciousness, invited paper for the University of Florida’s Philosophy Department Colloquium, 2002.

Carruthers’ Solution of the Hard Problem, presented at the Florida Philosophical Association, 2001.

Advancing the Debate, presented at the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness at Duke University, 2001.

The Threat of Type Epiphenomenalism for HO Theories of Consciousness, presented at the Florida Philosophical Association, 2000.

Two Concepts of ‘Conscious of,’ presented at the Florida Philosophical Association, 1999.

Works in Progress:

Philosophy of Animal Minds: New Essays on Animal Thought and Consciousness (edited volume)

A Puzzle in Non-Human Theory-of-Mind Research: How to Distinguish Mentalists from Behaviorists (paper)